2. Governance: SCDDD Council of the Wise and Obasanjo
As Nigeria moves toward the 2027 general election, the country’s political class is again confronting a familiar and dangerous question: whether competition for power can be conducted without violence, intimidation, ethnic mobilisation and the institutional strain that have accompanied previous electoral cycles.
Against that backdrop, the Savannah Centre for Diplomacy, Democracy and Development (SCDDD), through its Council of the Wise, has intensified efforts to place elder statesmen at the centre of conflict prevention. In August 2026, the Council’s chairman, Justice Olukayode Ariwoola (rtd.), met former President Olusegun Obasanjo as political actors prepared for the formal opening of the 2027 election campaign season on August 19.
The stated purpose was not merely ceremonial. The engagement reflected a broader intervention aimed at persuading senior political figures, traditional leaders, retired jurists, former public officeholders and influential civic actors to counsel politicians against what Nigerians have long described as “do-or-die” politics. The objective is to promote a peaceful, credible and inclusive electoral environment before campaign rhetoric hardens into conflict.
For Nigeria, Africa’s largest democracy by population, the stakes extend beyond electoral procedure. A disputed or violent election can damage public confidence in institutions, discourage investment, disrupt livelihoods and deepen existing divisions across religious, regional, ethnic and class lines. The SCDDD initiative therefore raises a central question about democratic governance: can moral authority and high-level mediation succeed where formal laws and electoral regulations have repeatedly been tested?
Context and Background
The SCDDD has established itself as a policy and advocacy institution concerned with diplomacy, democratic development, conflict management and public-sector governance. Its approach reflects an understanding that elections are not isolated events. They are the culmination of years of political organisation, public discontent, elite bargaining, party primaries, campaign financing and contestation over state power.
In Nigeria, election periods have often generated anxiety because political office carries exceptional economic and institutional value. Control of federal and state governments can determine access to public contracts, appointments, patronage networks, security influence and development priorities. In an economy marked by unemployment, inflation, insecurity and uneven access to public services, electoral competition can become an intense struggle over resources as much as ideology.
The 2027 election will take place after a period of significant economic pressure. Households have faced high living costs, currency volatility, fuel-price adjustments and public frustration over insecurity. Such conditions can make political messaging more combustible. Candidates may exploit hardship for legitimate criticism, but they may also deploy resentment through scapegoating, disinformation or appeals to communal loyalty.
The role envisaged for the Council of the Wise is therefore preventive. Rather than waiting for violence to erupt, the Council seeks to encourage conversations among people capable of influencing party leaders and candidates before campaign-season tensions become entrenched.
Justice Ariwoola, a retired Chief Justice of Nigeria and former head of the judicial arm of government, brings particular institutional significance to that role. His participation connects the initiative to the constitutional principle that electoral disputes must be resolved through lawful mechanisms rather than intimidation or violence. Retired judicial figures do not determine political outcomes, but their public interventions can reinforce respect for due process, electoral adjudication and the rule of law.
Obasanjo, meanwhile, remains one of Nigeria’s most consequential post-independence political figures. A former military head of state and a two-term civilian president between 1999 and 2007, he has continued to command attention across political, business, diplomatic and civil-society circles. His influence is complicated by history: he has been both a participant in and a critic of Nigeria’s turbulent democratic development. Yet precisely because of that experience, his voice carries weight in debates about democratic restraint and national cohesion.
“The security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.”
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as altered), section 14(2)(b).
This constitutional declaration is especially relevant during campaigns. Security is not only a matter for police deployment on polling day; it includes the protection of candidates, journalists, election workers, observers, party supporters and ordinary voters throughout the political process.
The Case for Elder Statesmen’s Intervention
The meeting between the SCDDD Council and Obasanjo reflects a long-standing African political tradition in which respected elders are called upon to mediate disputes that formal institutions cannot easily resolve. In Nigeria, however, the value of such intervention depends on its independence. Elder statesmen must be seen as advocates for constitutional order, not as unofficial extensions of any political party or candidate.
The language of “do-or-die” politics has become a powerful shorthand in Nigerian public life. It describes conduct in which electoral victory is treated as an existential entitlement and defeat as unacceptable. In practice, that mentality can manifest in voter intimidation, attacks on opposition offices, inflammatory language, manipulation of local grievances, online harassment, vote buying and efforts to undermine confidence in electoral institutions before votes are cast.
The Council’s appeal is important because elite rhetoric often has direct consequences at community level. When national figures frame opponents as enemies of a region, religion or ethnic group, local supporters may interpret political competition as a licence for confrontation. Conversely, when senior leaders publicly commit themselves to peace, accept lawful outcomes and condemn violence by their own supporters, they can reduce the space for escalation.
There is also a strategic dimension to engaging Obasanjo. His political stature allows him to communicate with actors who may not respond to formal appeals from civil-society groups alone. Such access can be useful in encouraging private commitments to restraint, particularly among party leaders who may be reluctant to make public concessions but are willing to accept counsel from respected senior figures.
Still, moral persuasion cannot substitute for enforcement. The credibility of a peace initiative will depend on whether political parties discipline candidates and supporters who violate commitments, whether security agencies act impartially, and whether the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) retains public confidence in its planning, technology, logistics and results-management processes.
Legal and Policy Analysis
Nigeria’s legal framework already contains substantial protections against campaign violence and electoral misconduct. The challenge has consistently been implementation.
Under the 1999 Constitution, sovereignty belongs to the people, and government derives its authority from them. Section 14 establishes democratic participation as a foundational principle, while section 15(5) directs the state to abolish corrupt practices and abuse of power. The Constitution also regulates political-party activity, including provisions governing party finance and the restriction on organisations other than political parties canvassing for votes in elections.
The more detailed rules are found in the Electoral Act 2022. Its provisions prohibit the use of force, violence, coercion and threats during political campaigns. The Act also creates offences around campaign conduct, bribery, undue influence and election-related financial abuses. Crucially, it provides a statutory campaign window rather than allowing unlimited permanent campaigning.
“The period of campaigning in public by every political party shall commence 150 days before polling day and end 24 hours prior to that day.”
Electoral Act 2022, section 150.
This provision is legally significant in assessing the August 19, 2026 campaign “kickoff.” Political mobilisation, consultations and party organisation may occur well before polling, but formal public campaigning must comply with the timetable published by INEC and the statutory 150-day limitation. Any political declaration of a campaign season cannot override the Electoral Act. SCDDD’s intervention is therefore best understood as a pre-campaign peace and governance initiative, rather than a substitute for the legally regulated campaign period.
The distinction matters. Premature campaigning can distort competition by allowing better-funded candidates to dominate public space long before formal scrutiny intensifies. It can also expose communities to prolonged political tension. INEC, the police, the National Broadcasting Commission, political parties and civil-society monitors all have responsibilities to distinguish legitimate political association from unlawful campaign activity.
Section 92 of the Electoral Act addresses prohibited conduct at political rallies, including the use of threatening, abusive or insulting language likely to provoke violence. Section 94 further prohibits the use of force or violence during political campaigns. These safeguards should be interpreted robustly in an era where political intimidation increasingly occurs online as well as at physical rallies.
Social-media platforms have transformed Nigeria’s political communications. They allow candidates and citizens to reach millions quickly, but they have also enabled the rapid spread of fabricated results, manipulated videos, hate speech and targeted disinformation. Legal enforcement must be balanced with constitutional protections for freedom of expression, but that balance does not protect incitement to violence or organised threats against voters, journalists and election officials.
The policy response should therefore be multi-layered: early-warning systems in conflict-prone areas; transparent enforcement of campaign-finance rules; rapid investigation of attacks; security deployments based on risk assessment rather than partisan instruction; and credible channels for reporting threats. Peace accords signed by candidates can help, but they should contain practical commitments, monitoring arrangements and consequences for breaches.
Beyond Election Day: Social and Economic Consequences
A violence-free election is not simply a democratic ideal; it is an economic necessity. Electoral insecurity can close markets, interrupt transportation, displace communities and discourage businesses from investing in areas perceived as unstable. Small traders, informal workers and young people are often the first to bear the cost when politics turns violent.
The effect on women and young voters is especially serious. Women frequently face harassment in political spaces and remain underrepresented in elective office. Young Nigerians, meanwhile, are often courted as campaign organisers and online mobilisers but may also be recruited into partisan violence. An inclusive electoral strategy must protect these groups while creating meaningful opportunities for participation beyond symbolic representation.
Credible elections also affect Nigeria’s international standing. As a regional power and a major member of the Economic Community of West African States, Nigeria’s democratic stability influences perceptions of governance across West Africa. A transparent and peaceful process would strengthen its diplomatic credibility at a time when democratic reversals and military interventions have unsettled parts of the region.
Impact and Future Outlook
The SCDDD Council of the Wise’s engagement with Obasanjo should be judged not by the symbolism of a high-level meeting alone, but by the institutional action that follows. The most useful outcome would be a sustained national engagement involving former presidents, retired jurists, religious leaders, traditional rulers, youth organisations, women’s groups, political parties, INEC, security agencies and the media.
Justice Ariwoola and other members of the Council can help frame electoral peace as a constitutional obligation rather than a partisan preference. Obasanjo and other elder statesmen can use their access to press political leaders to reject inflammatory tactics, accept lawful dispute-resolution procedures and prevent supporters from turning campaign rivalry into communal conflict.
But the ultimate test will remain institutional. Nigeria needs an electoral commission that communicates clearly, police forces that act professionally, courts that decide petitions efficiently, parties that obey their own rules and citizens who can vote without fear. Elder mediation can lower the political temperature; it cannot replace accountability.
As 2027 approaches, the SCDDD initiative underscores a basic democratic truth: elections are not won only at the ballot box. They are also won or lost in the months beforehand—in the language leaders choose, the laws institutions enforce, and the willingness of powerful figures to place the republic above personal ambition.
